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‘Habitation versus Improvement’ 





The bank bailouts enacted by the Brown Government in the wake of the 2007 credit 
crunch have had a distinctive political character.  Despite the Government’s 
pronouncements on the merits of swift and decisive interventions, I argue that this 
does not amount to a return to the interventionist regulatory form associated with 
post-war British welfare capitalism.  The Polanyian distinction between ‘habitation’ 
and ‘improvement’ is used to show that the bailouts were designed by contrast to 
defend the underlying deregulatory logic of the existing financial regime.  The only 
real change of note was to forcibly uncover the often hidden influence of the state in 
the making and regulation of an ostensibly market-led neoliberalism and the creation 
instead of a much more overt state-led neoliberalism.  Habitation strategies were 
incorporated into a structure of financial deregulation, making it more rather than less 
difficult to rejuvenate state capacities consistent with enhancing societal welfare.  The 
bank bailouts offered short-term salvation for distressed firms within the financial 
sector without providing the state with socialised control over the conduct of banking 







In an infrequently referenced chapter from The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi 
quoted directly from a 1607 Lords’ Report in an attempt to capture the problems 
which arise when society is subjected to economic transformation.2  The Report stated 
that such dynamics evoked competing objectives: ‘The poor man shall be satisfied in 
his end: Habitation; and the gentleman not hindered in his desire: Improvement’.  
Polanyi (1957 [1944], p. 34) paraphrased the passage to highlight ‘the tragic necessity 
by which the poor man clings to his hovel, doomed by the rich man’s desire for a 
public improvement [of the economy] which profits him privately’.  He then turned 
the tension between habitation and improvement into a general explanation of the 
social disruptions which follow when the encroachment of market logic assimilates 
increasing elements of everyday life to the price system.  Improvement passes as a 
synonym in the rest of The Great Transformation for the wilful extension of market 
logic in the name of economic progress, whilst habitation describes attempts to seek 
shelter in government interventions from the coordination of economic activity by 
price signals alone (Polanyi, 1957 [1944], pp. 68-76 and 223-36 respectively). 
 
In what follows, I use the Polanyian perspective of ‘habitation versus improvement’ 
to shed theoretical light on the British Government’s decision to counteract the effects 
of the credit crunch with increasingly large bank bailout packages.  Massive amounts 
of public money were made available to rid banks of their bad debts.  In particular, 
banks used concerted state support to immunise their underlying balance sheet 
positions from their failed investments in mortgage-backed securities and from the 
related effects of the short-selling of their stocks.  The Government took partial 
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ownership of banks in order to protect banks’ balance sheets from the full 
implications of subjection to the price system.  However, ownership was not 
translated into control of the level at which banks price their lending business.  As a 
result, banks’ customers continued to have their economic activity regulated by 
market logic imposed by banks even as the banks themselves escaped such regulation. 
 
Set within the context of Polanyi’s theory of economic development, this amounts to 
an obvious historical anomaly.  The clearest signs of habitation in Government policy 
in the context of the credit crunch involved the use of taxpayer money to fund the 
public rescue of banks from the consequences of their own market-based mistakes.  
The contemporary equivalent of the seventeenth century ‘poor man’ was required to 
finance the habitation of the contemporary equivalent of the seventeenth century 
‘gentleman’.  This historical role reversal folded the process of habitation into that of 
improvement and left significant numbers of people wholly unprotected by 
Government policy – even as they contributed to the tax returns which financed that 
policy. 
 
Set within Polanyi’s theory of market formation, however, the image of an obvious 
historical anomaly is much less apparent.  He rejected the idea which emerged out of 
the Austria of his youth that the instantiation of markets simply follows the 
manifestation of spontaneous order.  Instead, he attempted to show how the 
reproduction of markets requires concerted and often coercive state intervention, 
memorably arguing that “Laissez-faire was planned” (Polanyi, 1957 [1944], p. 141).  
Governments often present the reproduction of markets for ideological purposes as 
market self-regulation, but that does not diminish the state’s rule-making influence 
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over the way in which market outcomes are allowed to encroach upon everyday life as 
a means of producing compliance to a particular social order (Vogel, 1998, pp. 258-
61).  From a Polanyian perspective, the most significant change associated with the 
bank bailouts in Britain was from an ostensibly market-led neoliberalism to a much 
more overtly state-led neoliberalism.3 
 
The word ‘ostensibly’ is significant in this regard, because it enables the bailouts to be 
conceptualised as an act of revelation.  The banking crisis engendered by failing 
mortgage securitisation businesses and short-selling of bank stocks merely re-
emphasised by bringing to the surface a fundamental fact of market life: i.e., the role 
of state institutions in the sustenance of free financial markets.  The basic modus 
operandi of such markets is conventionally assumed to follow not from state decree 
but from being populated by rational and self-disciplined financial actors.  The 
dynamics which led to the credit crunch have provided a rather different 
understanding of the underlying conditions of neoliberal finance, but the Polanyian 
perspective advanced here shows that it was never a credible explanation anyway. 
 
Three sections follow in an attempt to expand on such a claim.  The first analyses the 
content of the British Government’s assistance to banks so as to assess the character 
of its efforts to clear up the banks’ self-made mess.  The second retells the story of the 
interventions from a Polanyian perspective which highlights the tensions between 
habitation and improvement.  The third focuses on the possibility that these tensions 
are themselves magnified when the former is incorporated into the latter.  I conclude 
that the bank bailout packages contain the seeds of social instability when viewed 




The Bank Bailout Packages 
 
Mortgage securitisation techniques work by bundling together many individual 
mortgages into securities whose returns are higher the riskier the underlying mortgage 
loans.  The loan volumes required to facilitate expanding mortgage securitisation 
businesses reordered the underlying risk structure of mortgage lending during the 
house price bubble which ended in Britain in 2007.  Aggressive lending allowed loan-
to-value levels to rise to as high as 125% of the purchase price of the house on the 
expectation of continued further increases in house prices.  Such lending ensured that 
record volumes of mortgage advances were maintained for as long as the house price 
bubble remained afloat, thus leading to further house price rises and the continued 
profitability of trading mortgage-backed securities.  Yet, at the first sign that house 
prices had stopped rising, confidence waned in the continued viability of a mortgage 
lending market which had been bloated by aggressive lending.  This in turn 
undermined the structure of UK house prices, resulting in a record annual decline of 
15.9% in 2008 and a related precipitous fall in the market value of mortgage-backed 
securities. 
 
The various elements of the bailout packages were all oriented in their separate guises 
towards a single objective.  They were designed to remove market-purchased 
mortgage-backed securities from banks’ balance sheets at a price significantly above 
that prevailing in the market after the collapse of the house price bubble.  The 
presence of those securities on banks’ balance sheets – the now infamous ‘toxic 
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assets’ of public discourse – affected all banks’ perceptions of each other’s 
creditworthiness.  The knowledge that all banks were exposed to some degree to the 
falling value of mortgage-backed securities meant that they demanded greater 
assurances from one another that the asset-side of their balance sheets was not going 
to completely implode and cause them to default on short-term loans secured through 
the inter-bank lending market.  Yet, these were precisely the assurances that banks 
could not give without revealing stock market-sensitive information about the true 
scale of their losses.  It is this which led to the seizure of short-term inter-bank credit 
functions and the emergence of the credit crunch.  Moreover, short-sellers on the 
stock market reacted to the refusal of banks to provide credit to one another as an 
open admission that asset-side implosion was a distinct possibility.  The ensuing 
positions short-sellers took against the prevailing price of bank stocks seriously 
weakened the liability-side of banks’ balance sheets, thereby accentuating the 
difficulties on the asset-side and further eroding the health of the credit market. 
 
With the prospect of a wholesale meltdown of the banking system apparently too real 
to ignore, the Brown Government stepped in with a series of imaginative 
interventionist measures to guarantee short-term credit flows to banks.  In doing so it 
called upon the financial power of the state to override the price signals which were 
hampering banks’ room for manoeuvre on both the asset-side and the liability-side of 
their balance sheets.  It acted decisively to ensure that the fate of the banks was not 
left to market logic alone.  The liability-side was given state protection against 
adverse price movements on the open market through the announcement in September 
2008 of a simple four-month moratorium on short-selling 34 financial stocks (BBC 
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News, January 5 2009).  The asset-side was afforded similar protection, albeit via 
more complex means. 
 
The template for such protection was established by the introduction of the 
subsequently extended Special Liquidity Scheme in April 2008 (Bank of England, 
2008).  The Scheme enabled the Bank of England to issue bonds written against 
British government debt and to swap these bonds for banks’ failed mortgage-backed 
securities.  Crucially, the swaps took place at the equivalent of around a four-fifths 
discount on the market price of Government debt (Muolo and Padilla, 2008, pp. 274-
5).  In other words, the banks’ ‘paid’ at most only around a fifth of the market value 
of the bonds to revitalise their balance sheets in the face of the damage caused by 
overloading them with toxic assets.  The remainder of the bonds’ market value was, in 
effect, a direct credit gift from society as mandated by Government policy. 
 
The British Government has appropriated public money which might otherwise have 
been used for alternative redistributive purposes in order to socialise the losses banks 
have incurred through their global trading strategies.  This should be seen as a 
redistributive strategy in its own right.  But even though it is redistribution based on 
clear and authoritative state interventions it would be incorrect to view these 
developments as a return to a style of macroeconomic governance associated with 
post-war British welfare capitalism (Finlayson, 2009).  There is nothing classically 
Keynesian in the content of the bank bailout packages, despite them having been 
introduced through something which looks like a debt-financed Keynesian stimulus.  
The classical Keynesian strategy was to ensure that state interventions generated a 
combination of product prices and wages from paid work which allowed low- and 
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medium-income people to maintain high levels of consumption demand.  Whilst 
activated through similar policy means, the bank bailout packages seek merely to 
ensure that those same people remain linked to the banks’ activities in speculative 
asset markets (Crouch, 2009). 
 
The difference between the interventions associated with post-war British welfare 
capitalism and the bank bailout packages is exemplified by the fact that the latter 
contained only a one-way override of the price system.  The suspension of market 
self-regulation through the price mechanism extended only as far as restoring the 
health of the banks’ underlying balance sheet positions.  Banks benefited from the 
short-selling moratorium which protected the liability-side of their balance sheets 
from the price signals emerging from the stock market; they also benefited from being 
able to swap pristine government bonds for failed mortgage-backed securities in order 
to protect the asset-side of their balance sheets from the price signals emerging from 
the secondary mortgage market.  Yet, there was no reciprocal protection for bank 
customers as banks changed the terms on which they were willing to price credit.  
Credit became markedly more expensive than it was for the duration of the house 
price bubble as banks retrenched their lending strategies, increasing the cost of 
mortgage repayments at exactly the time that house prices were falling.  Even when 
the Brown Government purchased stakes in banks using public money it did not cash-
in its ownership rights as direct control of the price signals emerging from banks 
(Financial Services Authority, 2009).  The subversion of market logic occasioned by 




Polanyian Insights on the Bank Bailouts 
 
Polanyi worked with a broad conception of money, labelling it, along with land and 
labour, a ‘fictitious commodity’.  All three share the same character under capitalism 
of being bought and sold as if they were commodities without first having been 
produced for sale (Polanyi, 1957 [1944], p. 72).  In Polanyi’s formulation, money has 
an existential essence related to its social function as a store of wealth.  This predates 
its subjection to the ‘commodity myth’ and its appropriation in late capitalism for 
strategies aimed at profiting from trading monetary values (Polanyi, 1982, p. 46).  The 
creation of markets for the self-valorisation of money is a recent development in 
economic history and the creation to that same end of the appearance of self-
regulating markets coordinated simply by price signals is a more recent development 
still (Braudel, 1982; Michie, 2001; Fraser, 2005). 
 
In this way, money relations – what typically in political science is known as 
‘finance’ – have been increasingly disembedded from society.  Polanyi described 
disembeddedness (1957 [1944], p. 68) as a situation in which markets become ‘more 
than accessories of economic life’.  Apparently self-regulating markets impose 
themselves on society via price signals by requiring individuals to become functional 
to their operation.  In perhaps his most evocative description of the tendency, he 
argued (1957 [1944], p. 41) that it amounted to ‘no less of a transformation than that 
of the natural and human substance of society into commodities’.  He attributed such 
a shift to the desire for improvement: the willingness to view the economy, not as a 
process for satisfying social needs, but as a site for transposing other people’s labour 
into self-valorising money through changes to financial prices. 
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Polanyi believed (1957 [1944], p. 40) that the coordination of everyday life by the 
price system led necessarily to an ‘avalanche of social dislocation’.  He further argued 
that this would be detrimental to the habitation strategies of the vast majority of 
ordinary people.  In order to secure both their livelihoods and their lives against the 
commodifying effects of price signals, ordinary people should be expected to seek 
ways of using the state to subvert the pristine nature of the price system (Inayatullah 
and Blaney, 1999, p. 328).  From a Polanyian perspective, state overrides of price 
signals related to finance are consistent with attempts to re-embed money relations 
within society – i.e., ensuring that money relations are functional to the expansion of 
societal welfare, rather than society being functional to the self-valorisation of money. 
 
The credit crunch of 2007-2009 certainly produced a context in which the Brown 
Government appeared to endorse the legitimacy of habitation strategies.  At the very 
least, we witnessed the effect on the price system predicted by Polanyi’s habitation 
approach.  The Government used significant sums of public money to underwrite 
banks’ balance sheet positions against the consequences of shifting price signals in 
both the secondary mortgage market and the stock market.  These are protective 
interventions which impede the logic of market self-regulation associated with 
improvement.  So far, so good – apparently – when trying to match the Brown 
Government’s interventions with Polanyi’s explanation of how money relations are 
re-embedded within society. 
 
However, difficulties arise in extending the analogy when we consider the contents of 
the habitation strategies.  Pushing the analysis in this direction reveals not a 
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straightforward repetition of the process described in Polanyi’s historical example, but 
what in effect are two entirely separate processes.  Polanyian habitation emphasises 
society as a whole as the originating site for the subversion of price signals, in 
addition to assuming that enhanced societal welfare will result from successful 
protection against adverse price movements.  This is because the fictitious 
commodification which accompanies the extension of market self-regulation into ever 
more areas of everyday life produces human tensions that the market mechanism 
alone cannot resolve (Hechter, 1981, p. 424; Baum, 1996, p. 4).  The pressures for 
habitation must therefore emerge from sources which manifest these human tensions 
(Polanyi, 1957 [1944], p. 131).  The character of protective legislation in the context 
of the credit crunch could hardly have been more different.  Despite post hoc 
rationalisations from the Government that they were pro-growth and therefore pro-
society interventions, in the immediacy of their enactment they were designed solely 
to alleviate the balance sheet tensions which would have arisen from a refusal to offer 
banks the preferential treatment of temporary respite from market self-regulation.  At 
no stage were the human tensions which emerge in general from the commodity 
myths of market self-regulation the focus of policy. 
 
The Government repeatedly insisted after it acted to ameliorate banks’ balance sheet 
distress that inactivity was not a viable alternative.  This appears to be a reasonable 
position to take, especially in the context of the Icelandic experience of wholesale 
economic dislocation and the destruction of personal wealth when the banks could not 
be bailed out.4  However, my argument is that the character of the bank bailout 
packages is just as important politically as their fact.  What is most interesting in this 
respect is that the Government’s presentation of the choice between policy inactivity 
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and policy activity in effect reduced to two different ways of ensuring the continued 
exposure of society to the commodity myth.  This most basic of all the features of 
Polanyian improvement was simply never challenged. 
 
The decision to have done nothing would most likely have accentuated the credit 
crunch.  The most obvious result – as best we can deduce – would have been a sharp 
increase in the cost of mortgage credit and an enhanced need amongst owner-occupier 
households to rely on commodified labour to meet mortgage repayments.  Yet, the 
policy action chosen by the Brown Government had noticeably similar effects.  The 
terms on which the banks were bailed out did not include the appropriation for society 
of banks’ pricing functions.  As a consequence, customers were faced with the same 
sort of increase in the cost of credit as would likely have occurred in the ‘no action’ 
scenario.  In addition, the expansion of public borrowing to finance the bailouts has 
the opportunity cost of future cuts to other government programmes.  As this will 
almost certainly involve more restricted manoeuvre for welfare-enhancing 
expenditures, individuals’ ability to satisfy their welfare needs will in the future 
depend ever more on the income generated from paid work.  This in turn will mean an 
intensification of labour commodification, the only difference to doing nothing being 
the delayed timing of when the intensification kicks in as the constraints on welfare-




The Defence of Disembedded Money Relations 
 
In strict Polanyian terms the habitation demands to which the Brown Government 
acceded in its management of the credit crunch do not deserve the name ‘habitation’.  
They better fit his description (1957 [1944], p. 37) of ‘a reactionary interventionism’ 
in which a clear strategy for enhancing societal welfare is subordinated to ‘an easy 
prevailing of private interests’.  The fact that the Government chose not to 
complement its ownership stakes in banks by immediately assuming control of the 
price level at which customers borrowed from banks is important in this respect.  
Such control would have been the normal expectation of nationalisation as the 
Treasury bought into banks on behalf of the state, but the model of nationalisation the 
Government chose in practice amounted to nothing more than state-led neoliberalism.  
It inserted the state in place of a temporarily missing market in private credit flows, as 
distinct from using the state to challenge the very premise of credit market self-
regulation.  In effect, it required taxpayers to pay heavily for ensuring that the banks’ 
privileged position in the relationship with their customers remained much as it has 
been since the liberalisation of that relationship really took off in the 1980s.  The 
irony of this situation is that taxpayers and bank customers are often exactly the same 
people.  Thus, the bank bailout packages manifest a Government-brokered context in 
which the majority of British households will have to contribute to financing their 
own continued subjugation in their everyday relationship with banks. 
 
In my reading of events, the public underwriting of banks’ balance sheet positions 
offered protection for the long-term trend towards financial deregulation not against 
it.  They were normalising interventions aimed simply at the immediate stability of 
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the system, where the underlying conception of ‘normal finance’ was one in which a 
price-emitting system suppresses societal expectations about the possible 
reinvigoration of British post-war welfare capitalism.  The structures of that regime 
relied for their internal coherence on the deliberate embedding of money relations 
within an economy oriented specifically to the expansion of consumption possibilities 
for low- and medium-income members of the population (Pierson, 2006, pp. 46-8).  
The embedding of money relations within society requires the regulation of financial 
prices and, more broadly, a regulatory ethos which consciously sets out to subvert 
market logic in order to exercise social control over price signals emerging from 
banks.  The bank bailout packages introduced by the Brown Government made no 
such incursions against market logic.  They ensured that money relations remained 
obdurately disembedded from society throughout the introduction of the bailouts, 
even as public money was called upon to prop up a faltering system of ostensible 
market self-regulation. 
 
It is for this reason that I distance myself from all possible Keynesian interpretations 
of the bailout packages and adopt a Polanyian interpretation instead.  Keynesian 
interpretations (e.g., Ambachtshee et al, 2008, p. 49; Morris, 2009, p. 123; Read, 
2009, p. 201) highlight the size of the bailouts and their implications for aggregate 
levels of public expenditure, but the fact that their introduction did not include any 
provisions for reversing the disembeddedness of money relations is much more 
pertinent.  No truly Keynesian strategy for re-regulating finance could ever leave such 
conditions intact (Keynes, 2006 [1936], p. 259).  Yet, this does not mean that an 
alternative Polanyian interpretation can be imposed in its place in any straightforward 
manner.  At the very least, the relationship between the disembeddedness of money 
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relations and the Brown Government’s enactment of policies of habitation is not 
simply as Polanyi described it in The Great Transformation. 
 
The character of the bank bailout packages is consistent with the appropriation of the 
mechanism of habitation in the interests of preserving the character of the existing 
drive for improvement.  No longer is habitation necessarily related oppositionally to 
improvement in the struggle for society to impose its interests in the re-embedding of 
money relations.  Instead, it has been co-opted as a means of guaranteeing that the 
long-term trajectory of a distinctively neoliberal improvement process is not blown 
off course by a little local difficulty within the banking sector.  The systematic failure 
of banks’ over-investment in what are now worthless mortgage-backed securities 
could have been interpreted as evidence of essential flaws infecting the whole system 
of disembedded money relations, but instead the Government chose to present it as a 
weakness of particular managerial strategies within the banking sector. 
 
The long-term implications of the bank bailout packages are also likely to impede 
future successful enactments of genuine Polanyian habitation strategies.  The bailouts 
have released the banks from the responsibility of facing up to their own mistakes in 
misreading the price signals emerging from the mortgage securitisation market.  But 
they have done so at the cost of significantly increasing the level of outstanding 
government debt.  The need to pay down this debt will seriously inhibit any future 
programme designed to enhance societal welfare in the manner of genuine habitation.  
According to Polanyi (1957 [1944], p. 3, p. x), such situations arise after the process 
of labour commodification has reached a tipping point at which it ‘annhilat[es] the 
human and natural substance of society’, whereupon it creates ‘a ruthless abnegation 
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of the social status of the human being’.  But the long-term implications of financing 
the bailouts through government debt suggests that the future lives and livelihoods of 
more and more people will be increasingly conditioned by how they position 
themselves in relation to price signals emitted by the labour market.  It thus becomes 
possible that the tipping point will come clearly into view as the process of repaying 
the accumulated debts ratchets up the degree of labour commodification across British 
society as a whole.  This suggests that the distorted habitation strategies enacted in 
response to the credit crunch could well lead to escalating demands for genuine 
Polanyian habitation at exactly the moment that constrained public finances make 
such initiatives impossible to fund. 
 
All of this points to a potentially important social contradiction which exists at the 
heart of the Brown Government’s bank bailout packages.  Yet, this in itself might 
come as little surprise.  The adoption of a Polanyian perspective on any aspect of 
modern economic life immediately raises the possibility of its incorporation into a 
contradictory social whole.  In Polanyi’s account (1957 [1944], p. 210), such 
contradictions arise when governments issue special favours to certain interests in 
terms of providing protection from a system of price-emitting markets whilst stopping 
short of extending those same favours to everyone.  This is certainly the case in the 
preferential treatment offered to banks in an attempt to alleviate a balance sheet mess 
of their own making.  Indeed, the impact of the bailouts on the public finances will 
likely ensure that this asymmetric arrangement becomes even more pronounced in the 







In the immediate aftermath of the bank bailouts, much of the broadsheet commentary 
embraced the notion that the speed and the scale of the interventions marked a 
decisive end to the previous era of neoliberal regulation.  In his respected Financial 
Times column, Martin Wolf (March 25 2008) went as far as to hail the death of the 
very idea of free market capitalism.  For many people of a progressive political 
orientation, this was the one silver lining of the gloomy economic outlook which 
accompanied the recessionary impact of the credit crunch.  I have used the foregoing 
pages to argue that any such celebration is premature.  The character and the content 
of the Government’s interventions are more important than their speed and their scale.  
At most they seem to signal a move from an ostensibly market-led neoliberalism to a 
much more obviously state-led neoliberalism.  They do not preserve Polanyi’s 
understanding of the oppositional essence of habitation and improvement.  Instead, 
they turn habitation strategies into a functional accessory of the broader trajectory of 
improvement.  In practice, this has meant rescuing banks from their own mistakes 
whilst passing on the costs of those mistakes to society in the form of further fictitious 
commodification.  Government interventions have breathed new life into the effects 
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